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I. INTRODUCTION 
In its entirety, the Fourth Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.1 
Congress passed the Fourth Amendment (“the Amendment”) on September 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Political Science and 
Business Administration, cum laude, 2017, Seton Hall University. I would like to give a 
special thanks to my family for their endless love, support, and encouragement in all of my 
endeavors. 
 1   U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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25, 1789, and it was subsequently ratified on December 15, 1791.2  When it 
was written over two hundred years ago, the writers intended for the 
Amendment to provide exactly what it said— protection for citizens from 
unlawful searches and seizures absent a warrant or probable cause.3  At the 
time the Fourth Amendment became part of the Constitution, it was only 
intended to be applied to the federal government; later, however, the 
Amendment became applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment can be split into two 
ideologies: original intent and original meaning.5  Proponents of the first 
ideology would look at the constitutional framer’s understanding when they 
wrote the Amendment.6  In other words, advocates of original intent see the 
Amendment as covering exactly what the framers wrote at the time; 
therefore, the Fourth Amendment would not cover devices—such as cell 
phones—that did not exist in the eighteenth century.7  On the contrary, 
proponents of original meaning ask what a reasonable person would interpret 
the meaning of the Amendment to be at the time of its ratification.8  
Proponents of this theory look at the Amendment as ever-changing to 
provide protections consistent with the needs of the era—meaning that the 
connotation of the Amendment from the time of ratification (a guarantee 
from unreasonable searches and seizures) remains exactly the same, 
however, the definition of those domains protected by the Amendment 
(persons, houses, papers, and effects) are apt for a change of interpretation.9 
Whether a search is reasonable in the eyes of the law is determined by 
balancing two interests: (1) intrusion on the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
individual; and (2) legitimate government interests such as public safety.10  
In recognizing this, American jurisprudence has created exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement that respect these two interests.11 
 
 
 2   Id. 
 3   Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (“The well-known historical 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants and writs of assistance, 
was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man’s house, his person, his papers 
and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against his will.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. 
IV. 
 4   Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 5  Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 250 (2009). 
 6   Id. at 248. 
 7   See generally Colby & Smith, supra note 5, at 248. 
 8   Colby, supra note 5, at 250. 
 9   See id. at 250–53. 
 10   Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
 11   See id. An example of this would be a vehicle search by an officer during a traffic 
stop—but only with probable cause. 
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Applying the Fourth Amendment as it pertains to today’s digital age 
from an original intent standpoint presents many challenges; application of 
this ideology suggests that one’s electronic devices are not shielded from 
unlawful searches and seizures without a warrant or probable cause.12  
Modern interpretation of the Fourth Amendment leads to a peculiar issue— 
what is covered by the Fourth Amendment in the modern era?  For the 
purposes of this paper, an original meaning stance will be taken to explore 
the issue of whether or not the Fourth Amendment has effectively adjusted 
to the digital age.  A cell phone search can reveal as much about an individual 
as the search of a home, yet some courts have deemed warrantless cell phone 
searches constitutional.13  Thus, if a search of a cell phone is as invasive as 
that of a home, it stands to reason the same guidelines should apply when 
determining what constitutional protections are applicable.  Furthermore, an 
individual’s digital trail can be stitched together to paint a picture of his or 
her private life.14  The protections afforded to one’s “papers and effects” are 
a matter of privacy and if digital trails assist in taking away privacy, then 
they should be afforded protection under the Fourth Amendment. 
In an age where much of an individual’s life is centered around 
electronic devices, what is protected from unreasonable search and seizure 
by the Fourth Amendment?  In other words, what constitutes “papers and 
effects”?  The definition of “papers and effects” depends on an interpretation 
of what one can reasonably expect to be private.15  Do internet searches, cell 
phones, data stored in the “cloud,” emails, and all other aspects of one’s 
digital footprint fall under the blanket of protection the Constitution’s 
framers meant for citizens when writing the Fourth Amendment?  Under 
current law, these activities are given very little privacy protection, 
undermining constitutional safeguards that are essential to individual 
liberties and a robust democracy.16  This creates a privacy gap by denying 
Fourth Amendment protection to data processed by third parties, including 
data stored in the “cloud.”17 
 
 
 12   See generally Colby & Smith, supra note 5, at 250. 
 13   See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–97 (2014) (“[A] cell phone search would 
typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A 
phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; 
it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form—
unless the phone is.”); see also United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016); 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 14   See Riley, 573 U.S. at 396–97. 
 15   See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 16   Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the Third-
Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 247 (2016). 
 17   Id. 
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The issue at hand is whether the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test attributed to the Fourth Amendment adequately protects privacy interests 
in today’s digital age.  As time progresses and technology advances, the 
privacy gap has widened and no measures have been taken to fill the void.  
The laws governing online privacy are older than the internet and the laws 
in place protecting electronic communications are an inconsistent and 
illogical patchwork.18  In the digital age, the standard “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test attributed to the Fourth Amendment is outdated.  
The present test does not adequately protect digital communications and a 
different test is needed for digital communications, which the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”) should be updated to 
include.19 
This comment argues for the need for a distinct test for digital privacy 
protections accounting for the changes brought on by modern technology, 
which the ECPA should be amended to include.  Part II of this comment 
delves into the origins of digital privacy protections.  Part III critiques 
protections in place today, dissecting the fatal flaw in applying outdated 
mechanisms.  This section also analyzes what makes digital content different 
and how digital privacy rights can be secured through amendment of the 
ECPA.  Finally, part IV concludes that technological developments have put 
a tremendous amount of stress on the antiquated Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections of today and that a new framework for digital content should be 
implemented through the ECPA. 
II. A LOOK AT THE HISTORY OF DIGITAL PRIVACY 
A. Katz v. United States 
The springboard for digital privacy came in 1967 with Katz v. United 
States.20  Here, the petitioner, Katz, had been convicted of transmitting 
gambling information over the telephone.21  To acquire the information that 
led to Katz’s conviction, the federal agents investigating him attached an 
eavesdropping device outside the public phone booth used by Katz; at trial, 
the recordings of Katz’s conversations were entered into evidence to be used 
against him.22  The question presented in this case became whether the 
Fourth Amendment’s “unreasonable searches and seizures” protection 
required police to obtain a search warrant before wiretapping a public 
 
 18   Id.  
 19   See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–23 
(2018). 
 20   See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
 21   Id. at 348. 
 22   Id. 
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payphone.23  The Court ruled that the government’s use of an electronic 
device to record conversations inside a telephone booth without a warrant 
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.24  Katz declared that the Fourth 
Amendment “protects people, not places”; this was a dramatic shift in 
reasoning from previous rulings of the Court, which had been dominated by 
the concepts of property and trespass.25  Although Katz had been having a 
conversation in a public telephone booth, he sought to preserve the 
conversation as private—as demonstrated by his shutting of the booth door 
behind him; the government’s eavesdropping violated the privacy “upon 
which he justifiably relied.”26 
Out of this case came the “reasonable expectation of privacy” formula, 
commonly referred to as the Katz test.27  The test is based on the concurrence 
of Justice John Harlan in the case, in which he stated, “[m]y understanding 
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”28 
This test has become the balancing test of Fourth Amendment 
protection in many cases, particularly those involving electronic 
surveillance.29  Theoretically, this rule is reasonable because it would appear 
on the surface to help adapt Fourth Amendment protections to the evolving 
digital age.  However, the discretion is all in the hands of judges to determine 
if an individual truly expected privacy in a given situation, and then to decide 
whether society is prepared to accept that expectation as reasonable.30  New 
York University Law professor, Anthony Amsterdam, discusses the 
inquiries into the reasonable expectation test, calling them “needless,” 
maintaining that the inquiry into what society expects to be private “destroys 
the spirit of Katz and most of Katz’s substance.”31  Amsterdam goes on to 
note the government could quite easily weaken our expectations of privacy 
by “announcing half-hourly on television that . . . we were all forthwith 
being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance.”32  Amsterdam 
further expounds upon the idea that the government can effortlessly 
 
 23   Id. at 349–50. 
 24   Id. at 359. 
 25   Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 26   Id. at 353. 
 27   Price, supra note 16, at 249. 
 28   Katz, 389 U.S at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Price, supra note 16, at 261. 
 29   Price, supra note 16, at 262. 
 30   Id. 
 31   Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
383 (1974). 
 32   Id. at 384. 
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overcome privacy expectations, noting that expectations are shaped by what 
practices the law allows—making the Katz test somewhat circular.33 
While the test may have been workable enough in the era of its 
conception, applying the test to the modern era has weakened privacy 
interests.34  This issue will only worsen as time goes on if the test continues 
to be used in the digital era.35  Courts are unable to balance privacy interests 
against those of law enforcement, and as technology continues to advance, 
areas in which a person can reasonably expect privacy will decrease until 
this expectation becomes virtually non-existent.36 
B. “Reasonable” Expectations of Privacy 
The core policy concerns underlying the Fourth Amendment are the 
individual privacy expectations that individuals must possess for society to 
be free and functional.37  The problem with this statement, however, is it has 
not been made clear how this societal expectation should be measured.  One 
measurement for gauging reasonable privacy expectations is by “assessing 
the frequency of public traffic in an area”—in other words, if an activity is 
occurring in a public area with a high chance of discovery or observation, 
society should not accept a claim to privacy as valid or reasonable.38 
In looking at privacy expectations in the modern era, one can look to 
the relatively recent case of United States v. Jones.39  In Jones, the Court 
stepped away from the Katz standard and headed down a different privacy 
path.  This case dealt with a respondent who was under suspicion of narcotics 
trafficking.40  Authorities were granted a warrant authorizing them to put a 
Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking device on the underside of 
Jones’ vehicle; they did so, however, after the deadline stated on the 
warrant.41  Using the GPS device they had unconstitutionally installed, the 
officers tracked the vehicle’s movements and eventually obtained an 
indictment against the accused, which included charges of conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine.42  The question posited in Jones was whether the 
 
 33   Price, supra note 16, at 262. 
 34   Id. 
 35   Id. 
 36   Brandon T. Crowther, (Un)Reasonable Expectation of Digital Privacy, 2012 BYU L. 
REV. 343, 344 (2012). 
 37   Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of Something a Lot Like 
Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 
24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 187 (2012). 
 38   Id. at 188. 
 39   See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 40   Id. at 402. 
 41   Id. at 400. 
 42   Id. at 403. 
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attachment of the GPS device to the respondent’s vehicle and its use to 
monitor the movements of the vehicle constituted a “search and seizure” as 
it pertains to the Fourth Amendment.43 
The ruling passed down in Jones stated, unanimously, that the 
installation of a GPS tracking device underneath Jones’ car qualified as a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.44  It might be presumed that the Court 
came to this conclusion through the application of the Katz test45; however, 
in this instance the Court switched gears, instead applying a trespass doctrine 
from the 1928 case Olmstead v. United States.46  Due to what the Court called 
a “physical intrusion”—the means by which the officers accessed the vehicle 
to attach the device47—the Court chose to abandon Katz in this instance.48  
Because of the nation’s incessant reliance on technology as a form of 
communication, a reasonable theory is that Scalia felt society’s expectation 
of privacy was eroding.49  With today’s heavy reliance on social media as a 
form of interaction, the lines of what privacy rights citizens consider 
“reasonable” become blurred.  Katz cannot provide the Fourth Amendment 
protection it was intended any longer. 
C. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Because many forms of communication were not properly protected, 
Congress implemented the ECPA in 1986 in an effort to keep up with new 
technologies.50  The ECPA governs prohibitions on the interception of 
electronic communications.51  The ECPA prohibitions relate to “any wire, 
radio, electromagnetic, photo-optical or photo-electronic facilities for the 
transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer 
facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such 
communications.”52  Katz stands for the idea that no Fourth Amendment 
protection exists without a reasonable expectation of privacy.53  If there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, then there is no violation of a Fourth 
 
 43   Id. at 402. 
 44   Id. at 404. 
 45   Because Katz was the usual test for Fourth Amendment protection in these types of 
cases. 
 46   Brian M. Kistner, The Fourth Amendment in the Digital World: Do You Have an 
Expectation of Privacy on the Internet?, Seton Hall Law School Student Scholarship 1, 10 
(2016); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 47   The officers encroached on private property to access the vehicle. 
 48   Jones, 565 U.S. at 400. 
 49   Kistner, supra note 46, at 11. 
 50   1-2 Law of The Internet § 2.03(4)(a) (2017). 
 51   18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–23. 
 52   18 U.S.C. § 2510(14). 
 53   See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
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Amendment right for a claim based on the ECPA.54  While the ECPA granted 
protection to previously unprotected forms of electronic communication, the 
legislation still leaves something to be desired. 
When the ECPA was enacted, its creators did not foresee the 
technological society we live in today.  Its provisions were meant to deal 
with government intrusions by technology of the time, which has grown to 
be worlds apart from that which exists today.55  The immense amount of data 
that technology is capable of collecting creates far greater implications for 
Fourth Amendment protections than the ECPA writers could have possibly 
imagined.56  Present protections fall flat—data is and should be recognized 
as fundamentally distinct.  As the ECPA exists today, courts are left to 
attempt to apply provisions meant for traditional surveillance methods to 
digital searches. 
D. Another Layer: Mosaic Theory 
United States v. Maynard, decided in 2010, held the government’s 
warrantless surveillance of a defendant via a GPS device mounted on his car 
for over a month violated the Constitution’s protection against warrantless 
searches.57  The striking similarity to the Jones case is to be noted; the court 
in Maynard stepped away from the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the 
time—just like in the Jones ruling.58  To reach their ruling, however, the 
Maynard court used what is known as the mosaic theory and adapted it to 
the context of the Fourth Amendment.59  Under this “mosaic theory of 
privacy,” while individual actions of law enforcement may not be considered 
searches for Fourth Amendment purposes, when taken together they may be 
considered searches.60  Prior to Jones, decisions regarding the Fourth 
Amendment had always broken down each part of an investigation 
individually.61  GPS surveillance decisions could indicate the Court is ready 
to embrace a new mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment protection. 
 
 54   1-2 Law of The Internet § 2.03(2) (2017). 
 55   See Jennifer Arner, Looking Forward By Looking Backward: United States v. Jones 
Predicts Fourth Amendment Property Rights Protections in E-mail, 24 GEO. MASON U. CIV. 
RTS. L.J. 349, 360. 
 56   See id. 
 57   See generally United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 58   Compare id. at 559–61 (surveying recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence), with 
Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (noting the Court’s shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence after 
1967). 
 59   Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; see also Erin Smith Dennis, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, 
the Fourth Amendment, and Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 738 
(2011). 
 60   Dennis, supra note 59, at 738. 
 61   Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 
312 (2012).  
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What sets the mosaic theory apart from traditional Fourth Amendment 
search doctrine is that it looks at government conduct as a whole rather than 
as individual steps.62  The mosaic theory looks at whether non-searches, 
when analyzed in the aggregate, are so revealing they amount to a search.63 
III: CRITICISMS OF TODAY’S DIGITAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
A. Criticism of Katz 
The standard “reasonable expectation of privacy” test attributed to 
Fourth Amendment searches dates back to Justice John Harlan’s concurrence 
in Katz v. United States.64  The binary requirement of the test is that “a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”65  The requirements set forth make sense logically, but each is 
not without its own issues when applied to the modern digital context. 
The first prong of Katz requires that there be a subjective interest of 
privacy to establish a legitimate privacy interest.66  The policy rationale 
behind this is that there is no reason why a right of privacy should be granted 
to an individual who does not have an actual expectation of privacy.67  The 
problem with this rationale is that it is difficult to determine whether an 
individual has a subjective expectation of privacy.  The Supreme Court has 
not been able to provide much guidance on this standard because it is 
unavoidably fact intensive.  The only insight the Court has provided is that 
an individual must outwardly show in some way that he seeks to preserve 
something as private, essentially applying an objective measurement to this 
subjective prong.68  For an individual to have an expectation of privacy, the 
external evidence must show he sought to protect something as private 
through his conduct.69  On the other hand, searches involving any sort of 
tangible object generally question whether the object is physically locked.70  
In a majority of cases, the subjective prong becomes inapt because it adds 
little to analysis.71  As expectation of privacy is a subjective concept, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether it exists or not.  Adding to this difficulty is the 
 
 62   Id. at 320. 
 63   Id. 
 64   Katz, 389 U.S at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 65   Id. 
 66   Id. 
 67   Crowther, supra note 36, at 346. 
 68   Id. 
 69   Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80 
MISS. L.J. 1033, 1057 (2011). 
 70   Crowther, supra note 36, at 346. 
 71   Id. at 346–47. 
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fact that often times even if a person were to have a subjective expectation 
of privacy, society would not recognize it as reasonable.72  The legitimacy of 
the subjective prong relies upon accurately determining one’s mental state to 
judge whether he actually expects privacy, which is exceedingly difficult.73 
The second prong of Katz relies upon society’s objective expectations.74  
Much like judging one’s subjective expectation of privacy, deducing what 
privacy expectations society is willing to accept as reasonable is an arduous 
task.  The Supreme Court fails to articulate a clear objective standard to 
measure society’s expectations, saying only that judges should look at 
“widely shared societal expectations” and giving no guidance as to how one 
should go about determining that shared expectation.75 
This prong of Katz has become an exceedingly flexible one—ultimately 
leaving what “society” is willing to recognize as reasonable up to one 
person—a judge.  This leads to inconsistent applications of the standard, 
which impedes the fundamental privacy interest.  These contentions are not 
without merit—even the Supreme Court has voiced its concern over Katz as 
a proper measure of Fourth Amendment coverage.76  In the 2010 case of City 
of Ontario v. Quon, the Court’s confidence in Katz was put to the test.77  The 
issue in Quon involved a police department supervisor’s searching of an 
officer’s private messages on an electronic mobile device that had been 
issued to the officer for use in his work.78  This search was not for nefarious 
purposes, but rather, because Mr. Quon had repeatedly gone over his 
message limit and the supervisor sought to determine whether the overage 
was for personal or work-related messages.79  The city of Ontario reserved 
the right through its “Computer Usage, Internet, and E-Mail Policy” to audit 
the messages, however, they contended they would not do so if the employee 
paid for overage—which Quon had done.80  The officer brought a Fourth 
Amendment claim against the city; applying Katz to the issue at hand, the 
Court was to evaluate society’s privacy expectations of text messages sent 
and received on an employer’s electronic mobile device.81  The justices in 
the case took issue with applying Katz to the case in assessing the privacy 
interest; they did not see a correlation between the privacy interest in a 
 
 72   Id. at 347. 
 73   Id. 
 74   Katz, 389 U.S at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 75   Crowther, supra note 36, at 348; see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 129 
(2006). 
 76   See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010). 
 77   Id. at 746. 
 78   Id.  
 79   Id. at 752. 
 80   Id. at 751–52. 
 81   Quon, 560 U.S. at 750. 
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telephone booth and that of texting at the office, as the two are worlds apart.82  
In the end, the Court decided that even if this surveillance constituted a 
search, it was reasonable—therefore, the City of Ontario did not violate Mr. 
Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights.83  Applied to the modern era, it has 
become evident that the Katz test has faced a plethora of issues with regard 
to its application to digital content.84 
B. What makes digital content different? 
It has become remarkably difficult to mechanically apply the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test because digital content inherently 
differs on many levels from that which Katz was originally applied to.85  
Digital content pervades virtually every facet of American life, creating a 
mass amount of digital information which only continues to grow larger.86  It 
differs from physical data in its quantity, quality, and permanence, among 
other things.  Information which was previously physical is now being 
converted to digital form, and computer technology has made it so the 
number of files, images, and documents one can create in the digital sphere 
is seemingly endless.87  Adding to this is the fact that computers often record 
information unbeknownst to the user—an individual’s internet history is 
recorded on his hard drive, constructing a trail of what has been done on that 
computer.88  Additionally, the permanence of evolving digital technology has 
changed the meaning of “privacy.”  As so much information and history are 
conserved online, it can be easily accessed and collected by the government 
in mass quantities. 
Perhaps the most drastic way that digital data differs from physical data 
is the quantity of information that can be obtained digitally.  A physical 
search of a home, for example, will only turn up so much digital information 
due to its capacity.  Conversely, a computer has a seemingly endless 
capacity, with the ability to hold up to terabytes of data.89  A digital search, 
therefore, is intrinsically different than a physical search because it gives 
access to massive amounts of information which could not possibly be 
obtained through a physical search. 
 
 82   Id. at 761. 
 83   Id. at 765. 
 84   See, e.g., Quon, 560 U.S. 746. 
 85   See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347. The test, when used in Katz, involved the use of a 
listening device on the outside of a telephone booth and whether the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy had been violated. 
 86   Scott D. Blake, Let’s Be Reasonable: Fourth Amendment Principles in the Digital 
Age, 5 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 491, 499 (2010). 
 87   Id. 
 88   Id. 
 89   Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010 (last accessed April 2, 2020). 
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With digital data differing in quantity, quality, and permanence from 
the traditional physical data that the courts have been accustomed to dealing 
with, the question then becomes how digital data should be treated with 
respect to the Fourth Amendment.  In this sense, the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test must be revaluated with respect to digital 
searches, as digital data should be protected just as efficiently as tangible 
objects. 
The technological developments of today have placed a tremendous 
amount of stress on the frameworks for Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections.  These protections developed in an era when electronics did not 
exist or otherwise were not prevalent, and the Supreme Court has been 
unsuccessful in keeping up with the application of the Fourth Amendment 
with today’s technology. 
C. Mosaic Theory Issues 
The mosaic theory presents a new challenge to settled law.90  The 
mosaic theory is premised on aggregation and takes re-evaluation of settled 
law in a substantially different direction.91  In light of new surveillance 
technologies, such as real-time GPS surveillance, the United States Court for 
the District of Columbia took what was then a conceptually new approach to 
Fourth Amendment law in the case of United States v. Maynard.92  This new 
“mosaic theory” approach sought to foster a constitutionally anchored 
“sphere of privacy” which would come into play under situations of long-
term, technology driven investigations.93  This set the approach apart from 
the mechanically applied Katz test in the sense that it generally provides a 
greater affordance of privacy to the monitored individual.94  The premise of 
the mosaic theory is that while a set of non-searches taken separately may be 
considered exactly that (non-searches), if the data taken in aggregate can 
create a mosaic which reveals essentially private insights about an 
individual, it will trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.95 
1. United States v. Maynard and United States v. Jones 
To understand the mosaic theory, one must first look to the cases of 
United States v. Maynard and United States v. Jones—these were separate 
cases dealing with the same issue.96  In Maynard and Jones, the respondents 
 
 90   Kerr, supra note 61, at 314. 
 91   Id. 
 92   Walsh, supra note 37, at 173. 
 93   Id. 
 94   Id. 
 95   See Kerr, supra note 61, at 313. 
 96   Maynard, 615 F.3d at 544; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 400. 
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were under the suspicion of narcotics trafficking; following a two-year 
investigation, it was discovered that the two men (Jones and Maynard) ran a 
“stash house”—the contents of which included ninety-seven kilograms of 
cocaine, one kilogram of crack, and $850,000 in cash.97  However, what is 
of primary importance here is not the results of the investigation, but the 
investigative techniques that lead to its culmination. 
To begin, Jones and Maynard were put under visual surveillance.98  If 
an activity is being conducted in a public area with a high chance of 
discovery or observation, it is suggested that society should not accept a 
claim to privacy as valid or reasonable—so, per the Katz test, this is not a 
search.99 
The second method used by the investigators goes a bit farther than the 
aforementioned, and involved the tracking of the suspects’ cell phones.100  
Here, the investigators applied for and obtained court orders which 
compelled Jones’ cellular provider to release the cell tower information for 
Mr. Jones’ phone.101  Cell phones function through connection to local cell 
towers, which in turn route communications.102  As such, cell phone 
providers keep records of which towers were used by which account.103  Most 
individuals tend to carry their cell phones with them, and consequently these 
cell phone records act as a tracking device.104 
The third method used by authorities was to obtain a warrant 
authorizing law enforcement to put a GPS tracking device on the underside 
of Jones’ vehicle.105  They did so, however, one day after the deadline stated 
on the warrant.106  This method is where a bulk of the Maynard and Jones 
cases focused.107  Using the GPS device they had unconstitutionally installed, 
the officers tracked the vehicle’s movements and eventually obtained an 
indictment against the accused.108  The question posited in Maynard and 
Jones was whether the attachment of the GPS device to the respondents’ 
vehicle and its use to monitor the movements of the vehicle constituted a 
 
 97   Maynard, 615 F.3d at 548, 567; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
 98   Id. at 549. 
 99   Walsh, supra note 37, at 188. 
 100   Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549. 
 101   Id. 
 102   Steven M. Harkins, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause Is Necessary to Protect 
What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1875, 1877 (2011). 
 103   See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 
600 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 104   Kerr, supra note 61, at 322. 
 105   Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 400. 
 106   Id. Because the device was installed after the deadline stated on the warrant, the use 
of the GPS device on the vehicle was warrantless. 
 107   See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 544; see also Jones, 565 U.S. 400. 
 108   Id. 
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search and seizure as it pertains to the Fourth Amendment.109 
The ruling passed down in Jones states unanimously that the 
installation of a GPS tracking device underneath Jones’ car qualified as a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.110  It might be presumed the court came 
to this conclusion through the application of the Katz test, however, this is 
where the mosaic theory came into play. 
The prosecution attempted to admit the GPS evidence the authorities 
on the case collected to show that Jones was involved, however, Jones moved 
to suppress it.111  The Court determined any evidence indicating the car was 
in Jones’ garage had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment; 
this was an area that it can be posited that Jones had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.112  However, the judge, citing United States v. Knotts, decided 
that the same analysis applied to GPS monitoring.113  Both Maynard and 
Jones were convicted and both appealed their convictions, however, only 
Jones challenged the GPS evidence allowed at trial.114 
Jones argued on appeal that Knotts should not be applicable because 
comparing a GPS device to a beeper was an invalid comparison technology-
wise; GPS tracking is far more advanced.115  This is where the mosaic theory 
argument came into play: the GPS device, when all the information it 
collected was pieced together, collected so much data that it created an 
exceptionally clear picture of the defendant’s life.116  This monitoring was so 
intrusive it bore resemblance to an invasive search.117  This argument 
convinced the Court to overturn Jones’ conviction on the grounds that the 
use of the GPS device over twenty-eight days was a Fourth Amendment 
search.118  In the court’s view, the monitoring of the GPS over time 
constituted a search because while, indeed, the public could observe Jones’ 
individual movements, it was highly improbable the public would observe 
 
 109   Id. 
 110   Id. 
 111   Id. 
 112   Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563–64. 
 113   Id. at 555–56 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (explaining that a 
person traveling on a public road has no reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore the 
use of a beeper positioned in a suspect’s car by authorities to broadcast location was 
permissible)). 
 114   See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 544; see also Jones, 565 U.S. 400. 
 115   Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556. 
 116   Id. at 562; see People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (determining 
that prolonged GPS monitoring yields a highly detailed profile beyond just location, but also 
of our associations and patterns); see also State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) 
(en banc) (stating that GPS tracking devices record travels and can be used to paint a detailed 
picture of one’s life). 
 117   See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012). 
 118   Maynard, 615 F.3d at 568. 
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the complete set of his movements that the GPS device revealed.119  The 
tracking painted an alarmingly clear picture of Jones’ life that he would not 
expect others to have.120  Although there were concurring opinions in 
Maynard and Jones, the opinions all agreed on one thing—that it was the 
collective sum of government action, not individual sequential steps, which 
are to be looked at when determining what counts as a Fourth Amendment 
search.121 
The Jones ruling may have reinforced Fourth Amendment rights as they 
pertain to GPS, but with technology constantly evolving it is impossible to 
say for how long the ruling will remain relevant.122  The third-party doctrine, 
or the idea that when one consents to releasing data to at least one third party 
(such as a cell phone provider) they have no reasonable expectation of their 
data being private, plays an incredibly large role in this.123  Physical contact 
no longer needs to be made in order to use GPS to track an individual; cell 
phone based GPS as well as programs integrated into vehicles (such as the 
Ford Sync or OnStar) make one’s GPS data property of a third-party, and as 
such can be obtained by law enforcement.124 
2. Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine is the Fourth Amendment rule which dictates 
that an individual gives up all Fourth Amendment protections with regard to 
the information disclosed to a third-party.125  Any assumption of purpose or 
confidence in the third party on the part of the revealing individual is 
irrelevant.126  Therefore, Katz does not apply, as an individual cannot have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information disclosed to a third party.127 
Critics of the doctrine make two arguments.128  The first criticism is that 
the doctrine does not accurately apply the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test.129  Indeed, individuals generally expect privacy with respect to 
third-party records such as phone records.130  Justice Marshall’s reasoning in 
 
 119   Id. at 558. 
 120   See id. 
 121   See Maynard, 615 F.3d 544; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 400. 
 122   See generally Jones, 565 U.S. at 400. 
 123   See Price, supra note 16, at 277. 
 124   See id. at 291–92. 
 125   Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528–29 (2006). 
 126   Id. at 529. 
 127   Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 128   See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); see also Joseph E. Schumacher & 
Christopher Slobogin, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth 
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by 
Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993). 
 129   Schumacher & Slobogin, supra note 128, at 732. 
 130   Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of 
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his Smith v. Maryland dissent reflects the same.131  It is difficult to reason 
that an individual “voluntarily” surrenders information to a third party such 
as a telephone company—they have no choice in the matter.132  The second 
argument critics of the doctrine make is that it grants government too much 
power—it gives government the authority to take more intrusive steps 
without constitutional oversight than is consistent with societal freedoms and 
expectations.133  This argument contends the government is given the power 
to, essentially, harass individuals.134  The major concern proponents of this 
argument have is that because third-party services such as Internet Service 
Providers and phone providers are so prevalent in today’s digital age, if these 
services take a growing role in government surveillance, the Fourth 
Amendment will regulate less digital surveillance.135  If the Fourth 
Amendment is not protecting third-party service, the government can collect 
more information that one might “reasonably” expect to be private from 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.136 
D. Securing Privacy Rights 
 
In Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence in Riley v. 
California, he argued: 
We should not mechanically apply the rule used in the 
predigital era to the search of a cell phone.  Many cell 
phones now in use are capable of storing and accessing a 
quantity of information, some highly personal, that no 
person would ever have had on his person in hard-copy 
form. 
Justice Alito further suggested that Congress or state legislatures 
consider new laws that draw rational divisions based on categories of 
information, otherwise privacy protection in the twenty-first century will 
suffer.137 
The best body to deal with the issue of privacy concerns with respect to 
electronic surveillance is the legislature; courts are reactive, but it is the 
 
Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315 (1981). 
 131   Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reasoning “it 
is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have 
no realistic alternative.”). 
 132   See Ashdown, supra note 130, at 1315. 
 133   White, 401 U.S. at 782 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 134   Id. at 752. 
 135   Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1087 (2002). 
 136   Id. 
 137   Riley, 573 U.S. at 407–08 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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legislature which has the affordance of being proactive.138  There lies little 
rationale in applying the outdated precedent of Katz, given that so little is 
private in the digital age.  The void that the obsolete Katz left must be filled 
legislatively to help deem what data can be considered private.139 
1. Why the ECPA Holds the Key 
Since its conception in 1986, the ECPA has been amended numerous 
times.140  However, none of the amendments adequately protected the 
electronic information of private citizens to the extent necessary in today’s 
digital age.141  The ECPA has not yet been amended to adapt to the 
technology of today to provide adequate Fourth Amendment protections.  
The ECPA holds the key because unlike the Fourth Amendment, which 
regulates only the government and private parties acting on the government’s 
behalf, the ECPA recognizes that private parties acting on their own can pose 
a serious danger to digital privacy.142 
While Congress may not have considered the technology-driven society 
we live in today when the ECPA was written, it is nonetheless the body that 
should address society’s advances in technology.143  Several jurisdictions 
have already considered the ECPA’s shortcomings in this respect; several 
states have enacted legislation affording stronger protection to digital 
information than the federal ECPA.144  This action by the states shows not 
only that the legislature is capable of adequately enforcing these protections 
but that, presently, the ECPA has failed to do so thus far.  Although the 
amendments made to the ECPA thus far have failed to adapt to the digital 
age, they are nevertheless the perfect conduit for doing so.145 
 
 138   Charles E. MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Doctrine is Rudderless in the Digital Age, Unless Congress Continually Resets the Privacy 
Bar, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 47, 67 (2014).   
 139   Id. at 68. 
 140   Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 871 (2004). 
 141   Id. 
 142   Id. at 872 (explaining as an example that “. . . if America Online can look through the 
e-mails of its 30 million subscribers and disclose the evidence to the police without restriction, 
this would gut Internet privacy protections. The Fourth Amendment does not restrict this 
disclosure, but ECPA does: in addition to restricting the ability of law enforcement to order 
private ISPs [internet service providers] to disclose communications to law enforcement, the 
law also restricts the ability of private ISPs to disclose communications to law enforcement 
voluntarily.”). 
 143   See discussion supra Part III(D)(i). Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which regulates 
only the government and private parties acting on the government’s behalf, the ECPA also 
regulates private parties acting on their own. 
 144   Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct. 
8, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law/. 
 145   See, e.g., id. 
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Courts have generally deferred to Congress on ECPA issues.146  
However, because Congress has not reformed the ECPA to provide guidance 
with respect to the technological boom, courts have inconsistently applied 
the statute.147  Today’s technology requires a new analysis because of how 
expansive and different technology is compared to when the ECPA was 
enacted; modern technology is fraught with exponentially more data.148  The 
courts’ inconsistent analyses show that the judiciary defers in whole to 
Congress on digital privacy issues.  Moreover, the previously examined 
cases show that judges all the way up to the Supreme Court lack the ability 
to aptly apply and understand technological differences.  Judges are, 
however, acutely aware of this issue.149  Additionally, the government has 
expressed similar concerns and promoted a legislation-based solution to this 
issue.150  Many factors and considerations are at play with such a complex 
statutory change, and the courts do not have the expertise or time to do so.  
The legislature is equipped to promote this change and probe the complex 
relationship between the Fourth Amendment and technology.151  The courts 
cannot, and should not, be left to decipher this statute which is inept to 
provide suitable guidance.  For courts to provide consistent decisions on 
Fourth Amendment issues involving digital data, the legislature must act to 
recognize modern technology’s implicit differences from the technologies 
that existed at the time of the ECPA’s inception. 
2. A Potential Mosaic Theory Framework Fix 
The mosaic theory presents challenges to modern day Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence (the Katz test), however, the Katz test is 
exceptionally outdated.  For this reason, it makes sense that Katz should be 
done away with regards to digital content and new legislation should take its 
 
 146   Achal Oza, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as E-mails Get 
Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1054–55 (2008). 
 147   See Meera Unnithan Sossamon, Subpoenas and Social Networks: Fixing the Stored 
Communications Act in a Civil Litigation Context, 57 LOY. L. REV. 619, 644 (2011). 
 148   See Peter Van Buren, 4 Ways the Fourth Amendment Won’t Protect You Anymore, 
MOTHERJONES (Jun. 26, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/how-fourth-
amendment-not-protect/. 
 149   Riley, 573 U.S. at 407–08 (Alito, J., concurring) (expressing a lack of confidence in 
the Court being the best entity to decipher the relationship between today’s technology and 
the Fourth Amendment) (stating that “I would reconsider the question presented here if either 
Congress or state legislatures . . . enact legislation . . . .”). 
 150   Brief of Amicus Curiae Michael Varco in Support of Respondent, Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 293 (2017) (No. 16-402), at 29 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 427–
28 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological 
change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative” because a “legislative body 
is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance 
privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”)). 
 151   See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 7. 
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place.  The mosaic theory may challenge the Katz test, but nevertheless, it is 
a new, mosaic theory-esque legislation that should be enacted in place of 
Katz. 
The mosaic theory gives rise to several challenges.  The first is the fact 
that the mosaic theory is a highly subjective concept.  Courts can choose 
whether to apply it, and the premises for doing so are extraordinarily varied.  
The mosaic theory is not a concrete legal concept, but rather a theory upon 
which many courts have begun to rely.152  As such, the mosaic theory brings 
with it many questions that the courts must address. 
The first of these questions is that of a standard.  This is necessary if 
courts are to adopt the mosaic theory.  This is important when observing 
mosaic theory interpretations of the past; one need only look to the pro-
mosaic opinions of Maynard and Jones to see that the same case can be 
interpreted many different ways.153 
Although the three examples that will be mentioned analyze the 
Maynard and Jones cases differently, they all agree on one thing: it is the 
collective sum of government action, not the individual steps, which must be 
analyzed to determine what counts as a Fourth Amendment search.154 
As previously discussed, the D.C. Circuit’s viewpoint in Maynard 
asked whether the government learned more than a stranger could have 
observed.155  This opinion introduced the mosaic theory.156  The court viewed 
government conduct as violating one’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
depending on the likelihood that the evidence collected was exposed to the 
public.157  However, this claim was one that blanketed the entirety of the GPS 
monitoring—the whole twenty-eight days the respondent was surveilled— 
not just the individual pieces.158  In the Circuit Court’s opinion, the 
monitoring in the Maynard and Jones amounted to a search because it was 
highly unlikely that the public would observe the entirety of the respondent’s 
actions.159  The public could, indeed, have witnessed individual parts of 
Jones’ movements, but it was essentially improbable for an individual to 
observe the entirety.160  The court wrote that the collective sum of the twenty-
eight days of surveillance revealed more than the sum of its parts; the non-
 
 152   David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 631 (2005). 
 153   See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; see also Jones, 565 U.S.  at 400–13. 
 154   See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561–62; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 155   Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560. 
 156   Id. at 562. 
 157   Id. at 558–59. 
 158   Id. at 560–61. 
 159   Id.; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 160   See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560–61. 
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searches taken in aggregate became a search because while the individual 
pieces seem meaningless in isolation, when assembled together they painted 
a mosaic revealing a clear picture of one’s life.161 
Justice Alito’s interpretation in the Jones case looked at societal 
expectations with regard to the practices of law enforcement.162  From his 
point of view, a search occurs when investigators amass and analyze 
evidence in a fashion which would concern members of society.163  In his 
concurrence, Justice Alito analyzed the case by asking whether the 
respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by long term 
monitoring of his vehicle.164  Alito then went on to make the claim that this 
monitoring encroaches on expectations of privacy.165  This type of 
monitoring would concern members of society because it is expected that 
law enforcement agents would not, but also that they could not, secretly 
monitor and index every movement of one’s car for such a long period of 
time.166 
Conversely, Justice Sotomayor looked at government power in her 
Jones concurrence.167  If the government can learn details about an 
individual’s personal life more or less at will, a search has occurred.168  In 
her concurrence, she argued that when assessing objective reasonableness 
per Katz, it is pertinent the monitoring paint a detailed, comprehensive record 
of one’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about a person’s 
family, political views, profession, religion, and other associations.169  
Justice Sotomayor took the stance that even the most seemingly innocuous 
data might be relevant to constitutional protection.170 
Another question pertaining to the mosaic theory that needs to be 
addressed is when the mosaic begins.  In traditional Fourth Amendment 
application, generally only the question of how the information is acquired 
is of particular interest.  However, now that the mosaic theory has entered 
the arena, the question becomes where the mosaic begins in terms of 
surveillance.171  As the mosaic theory articulates that it is the taking together 
of data to create a clear picture of an individual, it evidently extends beyond 
the acquisition of information stage, which is typically where traditional 
 
 161   Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. 
 162   Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 163   Id. 
 164   Id. 
 165   Id.  
 166   Id. 
 167   Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 168   Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 169   Id. at 415-16. 
 170   See id. 
 171   See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 59, at 768. 
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Fourth Amendment application stops.172  Aggregating the data that builds the 
mosaic requires taking it a step further—analyzing the data. 
Moreover, the question of how much data is enough to make a viable 
mosaic must be answered.  The GPS device in United States v. Jones was 
installed for twenty-eight days, which was deemed by Justice Alito as 
“definitely” being long enough; however, he presented no reasoning as to 
why this was the case.173  Where is the line drawn?  Was it drawn at two 
days—or at twenty-eight?  This is a critical question.174 
The general focus when it comes to the mosaic theory has been GPS 
surveillance, however, mosaics can be pieced together with other sorts of 
data as well.  Taking one’s web searches/sites visited, telephone numbers 
called, and emails in aggregate paints a clear picture of one’s life even 
without location monitoring.  Does the mosaic theory apply here as well?  
Add location data, and an even clearer profile of the surveilled individual 
can be put together.  While the mosaic theory may present challenges to the 
Katz test used to analyze Fourth Amendment claims, the philosophy 
underlying it is precisely what would make for a revitalized approach to these 
claims in the digital age. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The courts have presented few, if any, alternatives to Katz; however, it 
is evident that there is work that needs to be done in securing privacy rights 
in the digital age.  While today’s technology has innumerable benefits, it can 
also be used to gather information about individuals that would otherwise 
require a warrant.  Cell phones are an omnipresent aspect of the modern age 
and with their capabilities, they are able to paint a startlingly clear picture of 
one’s life.  Adding to this is the third-party doctrine, which essentially 
declares that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in information that 
has been voluntarily turned over to third parties.175  This would include 
information obtained by an individual’s cell phone provider.176  Public 
actions, such as traveling in a car, are likewise not afforded a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.177  By this logic, then, there is not much in this digital 
age entitled to a “reasonable expectation of privacy” as posited by Katz.178  
 
 172   See, e.g., id. 
 173   Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 174   See Kerr, supra note 61, at 333–34. Kerr’s article analyzes the length of time needed 
to create a viable mosaic and demonstrates that this is a critical, yet extremely complicated 
question. Courts must make fact-specific determinations of how much data is enough to make 
a viable mosaic. 
 175   See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
 176   Id. at 742–43. 
 177   See, e.g., Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
 178   See Katz, 389 U.S. at 362. 
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This suggests that the capabilities of today’s technologies should be shaping 
the average individual’s perception of their privacy; the problem with this is 
that, barring the “tech-savvy,” many individuals are unaware of the intricate 
capabilities of their devices or, perhaps more importantly, the doctrine that 
underlies it.  This presents a challenge to the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution. 
The technological developments of today have placed a tremendous 
amount of stress on the frameworks for Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections.  These frameworks developed in an era when electronics did not 
exist or otherwise were not prevalent, and the Supreme Court has been 
unsuccessful in keeping up with the application of the Fourth Amendment 
with today’s technology.  For courts to provide consistent decisions on 
Fourth Amendment issues involving digital data, the legislature must act to 
recognize modern technology’s implicit differences from the technologies 
that existed at the time of the ECPA’s inception. 
 
